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Love and Duty∗ 
Julia Driver 
Washington University in St. Louis 
 
 
…love as an inclination cannot be commanded; but 
beneficence from duty, when no inclination impels 
us and even when a natural and unconquerable 
aversion opposes such beneficence, is practical, and 
not pathological, love.  Such love resides in the will 
and not in the propensities of feeling, in principles 
of action and not in tender sympathy; and only this 
practical love can be commanded.1 
    ─ Immanuel Kant 
The thesis of this paper is that there is an important asymmetry 
between a duty to love and a duty to not love:  there is no duty to 
love as a fitting response to someone’s very good qualities, but 
there is a duty to not love as a fitting response to someone’s very 
bad qualities.2 I will be working with a fairly standard view of what 
love is:  it is an emotion or attitude experienced by persons in a 
relationship that involves a central commitment – the one who loves 
is concerned for the wellbeing of the loved one for her own sake.3  
This central commitment is necessary for love, but not sufficient.  
Further, this commitment is taken to dispose the agent towards 
∗ An earlier version of this paper was presented to the Philosophy 
Department at SUNY-Brockport in October 2013. I thank the 
members of the audience for their helpful comments. 
1 Immanuel Kant, Grounding of the Metaphysics of Morals, tr. James 
Ellington (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Co.), 12. 
2 Thus, the duty to love issue investigated in this paper has a narrow 
focus. There may be duties to love for other reasons – perhaps 
parents have duties to love their children, for example, since that is 
crucial to the child’s well-being. For this sort of duty to love issue, 
see Matthew Liao, “The Right of Children to be Loved,” Journal of 
Political Philosophy, 14 (2006), 420-440. 
3 Most accounts of love view this as a central component. See 
Kolodny, Abramson and Leite; also, on Iris Murdoch’s view love 
is a counter to egoism. 
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actions and other attitudes that relate to the well-being of the loved 
one.  One important feature of this emotional commitment is to 
make the person who loves vulnerable in a certain way.  Though 
Francis Bacon wanted to make a point about how greatness was 
encouraged by lack of attachment, there was some truth to his 
claim that a person with a spouse and children (a person who loves) 
“…hath given hostages to fortune…” since the wellbeing of the 
one who loves is deeply connected to the wellbeing of those she 
loves.  The source of the asymmetry that I discuss is the two part 
understanding of love:  the emotional part and the evaluative 
commitment part.  One cannot directly, or “at will,” control an 
emotional response, but one can undermine any commitment one 
would normally have under the circumstances.  Thus, the feeling 
of love is not a duty, though being disposed to act a certain way 
with respect to the person one has the feelings for is controllable.  
This two part understanding helps us to get a grip on how someone 
can ‘love’ and despise another at the same time. 
In the above passage Kant is generally taken to be, in part, 
making the point that love, as a feeling and form of emotional 
attachment to another person, is not something that can be 
commanded – not something that is subject to moral evaluation.  
This is because it is not under our control.  By contrast, practical 
love – a kind of beneficence from duty, not marked by “tender 
sympathy” – can be commanded.  But practical love does not mark 
special relationships with others.  We owe such regard to all rational 
beings. That there is a duty to love anyone, at least with romantic 
relationships and some familial relationships thus seems 
controversial, and indeed, positing such a duty might at first seem 
like a good reason for rejecting, ironically, a popular Kantian view 
of love.4  On Kantian views advocated by writers such as David 
Velleman, a duty to love seems to follow almost trivially from the 
commitments of Kant’s theory:  if the core of love is 
“…appreciation of someone’s value as a person…” and since we 
all have value as persons, we all ought to love each other.5  This is 
4 The exception to this seems to be relationships between parent 
and child, in which some believe the parent has a duty to love their 
child (and not simply to act as though they love their child). I will 
discuss this more at the end of the paper. 
5 This quote is from David Velleman “Beyond Price,” Ethics, 118 
(January 2008), 199. 
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a problem for the Kantian view since one core feature of love runs 
counter to this – that is the feature that calls for special 
consideration for those we love, and such consideration cannot be 
justified on the grounds that the person we love has special value.  
Of course, Velleman is well aware of this worry about the Kantian 
account he develops, noting that love isn’t just any appreciation of 
someone’s value as a person, but, additionally, “…is an appreciative 
response to the perception of that value.”6  Presumably, those we 
do not love are perceived to have value as persons as well, it is just 
that our response to their value is not “appreciative.”  Since there 
is no duty to appreciate another’s value as a person in the relevant 
sense, even on this view there is no duty to love. 
Other writers use the control intuition to motivate a rather 
different view of the reasons of love.   So, for example, some would 
hold that there is no duty to love because we cannot control our 
emotional responses, and without the ability to control we can’t 
have reasons to love that would underlie a duty or obligation to 
love.  The appeal here is to some version of the ‘ought’ implies 
‘can’ principle.  Nevertheless, S. Matthew Liao has argued that this 
line of argument won’t work since we do exert some control over 
our emotions.  We can’t always do so, granted – but there are 
techniques that people employ to generate emotional responses, 
such as when a boxer might try to make himself angry before a 
fight.7 
However, another view of love would also hold that there is no 
duty to love because love, by it s very nature, is not something one 
can have reasons for.  That is the No Reasons View, articulated by 
writers such as Harry Frankfurt and Aaron Smuts.8  On this view, 
love is just something that is impossible to justify by reasons since 
there is nothing more fundamental to appeal to in providing that 
justification.   For example, Irving Singer has argued that love 
bestows value on the loved one, and is not based upon an appraisal 
of the loved one, or a response to the value of a loved one.  Since 
it is not based upon value, or a response to value, there are no 
6 Ibid. 
7 S. Matthew Liao, “The Idea of a Duty to Love,” Journal of Value 
Inquiry, 40 (2006), 1-22. 
8 Harry Frankfurt, The Reasons of Love (Princeton University Press, 
2006); Aaron Smuts, “In Defense of the No-Reasons View of 
Love,” (unpublished manuscript). 
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justifying reasons for love, though of course one can provide a causal 
explanation for why particular individuals happen to fall in love, 
and thus causal reasons.  There may be the appearance of a false 
dichotomy here.  One might argue that love can involve both a 
response to value and a bestowal of value.  There is intuitively some 
truth to this, though, strictly, a no reasons view would hold that the 
response to value is not a necessary feature of love.  One person 
might fall in love with another person, stay in love, and find any 
explanation of that love utterly lacking, and that’s perfectly fine.  This 
may not be the typical case, but it can certainly occur.  On one of 
the contrasting views, people may certainly fall in love 
mysteriously, but once they are in love, there are reasons for love 
grounded, for example, in the relationship itself.9 
In any case, it seems to me that the Bestowal View and a pure 
version of the No Reasons View should be separated.  We can 
distinguish them in the following way: The Bestowal View denies 
that reasons for love exist independently of the attitude of the 
person in love; thus, they deny the pure appreciation view that 
holds that when one is in love, that love is justified in virtue of an 
appreciation of the qualities (for example) of the loved one.  The 
Pure No Reasons View denies not only that reasons of love exist 
independently of the attitudes of the person in love, but also denies 
that there are any kind of reasons at all for love.  On this view, that 
an agent loves another does not bestow value, either.  This might 
be a kind of love nihilism: it does not deny that people feel love for 
each other, but denies that there are any justifying reasons at all for 
it.  Those who adopt a No Reasons View are not pure in this sense:  
they do think that there are reasons, but those reasons are 
understood purely subjectively.  On a sophisticated version of the 
9 See Niko Kolodny’s “Love as a Valuing Relationship,” The 
Philosophical Review 114 (April 2003), 135-189. Kolodny is arguing 
against both the no reasons view and the quality view, in favor of 
the view that what provides reasons for love are the relationships 
themselves.  On the view that I am arguing for here, it may well be 
that the reasons for love are to be found in the relationships 
themselves; however, reasons against love can be found in the 
qualities of the person one loves. As I will argue, this is not 
incompatible with the Relationship View, since it is the qualities 
that indicate violations of relationship defining demands or 
requirements that underwrite the duty to not love. 
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view, love is characterized by my desire for the wellbeing of 
another, and by my endorsement of that desire that is cashed out 
in terms of higher order desires (for example, to maintain the 
relationship). 
On Bestowal View there is no duty to love.  Aaron Smuts 
quotes Helena from A Midsummer Night’s Dream to illustrate: 
How happy some o'er other some can be! 
Through Athens I am thought as fair as she. 
But what of that? Demetrius thinks not so. 
He will not know what all but he do know. 
And, as he errs, doting on Hermia's eyes, 
So I, admiring of his qualities. 
There is some intuitive pull to this idea.  It explains why those in 
love attach such value to the ones they love, even in recognition 
that from the impartial perspective, the one they love has no 
qualities that are truly more special than others. However, this 
example is not one that critics of the view would find threatening.  
That emotional engagement adds to aesthetic appreciation is 
commonplace.  The sorts of qualities that the quality theorist will 
identify as the fitting basis for love will be things like the loved 
one’s character traits, deeper qualities of personality.10 
There is another odd feature of the No Reasons View.  We 
have reasons to hate and sustain hate.  Some hate is warranted and 
some isn’t.  Advocates of the No Reasons View can simply hold 
that hate is just unlike love in this respect – that one needs reasons 
to justify hatred, even though one doesn’t need them, and, indeed, 
they don’t exist, in the case of love.  But a view that preserves a 
connection in terms of justification is to be preferred, and on the 
view that I propose we can make a similar observation about hate:  
there is no duty to hate, but there can be a duty to not hate. 
The part of my thesis that is probably less controversial, 
intuitively, perhaps, is the idea that there is a duty to not love 
someone as a fitting response to that person’s bad qualities.  
However, the duty to not love is problematic for many of the same 
reasons as a duty to love.  On the no-reasons view love is simply 
not something subject to any sort of justification.  Frankfurt, for 
example, holds that love involves first order desires for certain 
10 See Kate Abramson and Adam Leite, “Love as a Reactive 
Emotion,” The Philosophical Quarterly, 62 (October 2011), 673-699. 
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states, such as the loved one’s wellbeing, and second-order 
attitudes or, what Frankfurt calls ‘volitions’ that bear on how the 
agent “…is disposed to manage the motivations and interests by 
which he is moved…” 
We can distinguish a duty to not fall in love from a duty to not 
stay in love. Against this view, very many writers on love have 
pointed out that it seems that we can have reasons to abandon love 
– that it makes perfect sense to say things like “He ought not love 
her.”  Someone in an abusive relationship may have overwhelming 
reason to abandon the relationship and to cease loving the person 
they have the relationship with.  Even if the feelings are not 
eliminated by the abuse, the abuse constitutes a compelling reason 
not to love.  Possibly this case is special, since abuse represents a 
violation of the relationship itself, as well as a broader cruelty.  But 
a similar point can be made when the harm is outside of the 
relationship, as when one finds out the person one loves is a 
compassionless murderer.  In The Third Man Anna discovers the 
man she loves, Harry Lime, has been responsible for the deaths 
and serious illnesses of children who were treated with diluted 
black-market penicillin that he provided.  Yet she continues to love 
him, and more, she continues to believe that her love is 
unproblematic as love.  On the no-reasons view it is easy to account 
for the permissibility of falling out of love with Harry Lime – 
indeed, on this view, both love and failure to love are equally 
permissible and equally unsupported by any reasons.  The no-
reasons advocate will argue that the attitude is permissible still, but 
what is not permissible might be things such as acting on the 
attitude.  Perhaps it is simply Anna’s displays of love that are 
problematic, her attempts to help Harry avoid justice, not the love 
itself. 
However, one might hold that even though it is true that Anna 
has reason to not love Harry Lime once she discovers he is a 
murderer, it is still the case that since love is nonvoluntary, she 
should not be blamed if she continues to love Lime.11  If it is true 
that she should not be blamed, then she has no duty to not love 
him.  All that reasons for love can give us is a mode of criticism 
that focuses on whether or not the emotion is fitting to its object.  
If Anna loves Harry because she believes he is a warm 
humanitarian, then the emotion is not appropriate, since it is based 
11 Kolodny, 138. 
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upon a false belief – just as fear is not appropriate in circumstances 
in which one is not faced with a genuinely dangerous situation.  
Thus, if Anna loves Harry because she believes he is a warm 
humanitarian when he is not, then she has no reason to love him, 
just as someone who fears a dog thinking it is dangerous, when it 
is not, has no reason to fear the dog.  If this sounds odd, the view 
can be slightly amended so that fittingness is tied to reasonable or 
justified belief, but the general point would still hold. 
There at least two routes we can take in challenging this 
argument.  On one route we can argue that even though she is not 
blameworthy for loving Lime, she still has a duty to not love him.  
Another route, the one I pursue here, is to argue that blame is still 
warranted in such cases because love reveals one’s evaluative 
commitments in a way that reveals something about a person’s 
dispositions and character.  The duty to not love does not involve 
a duty to eradicate one’s feelings for someone, but will involve a 
duty to try to eradicate those feelings, and subvert any dispositions 
that come along with those feelings – dispositions to seek the well-
being of the loved one when that conflicts with justice, and 
dispositions to make excuses, and ignore the evidence. 
Alternative theories of the reasons of love will hold that it is 
perfectly reasonable for Anna to fall out of love with Harry once 
she finds out he is a murderer.  It is particularly easy for the Quality 
theory to account for this in that the Quality theorist can hold that 
Anna discovers that Harry lacks the features of character she 
thought he had, and thus her love, at the outset, was unfitting in 
some respect and when she is in a position to recognize this it is 
quite reasonable for her to tall out of love with him.  Of course, on 
this view it may also be reasonable for her to continue to love him 
even upon discovering he is a murderer, since there may be other 
qualities she is responding to that have not changed (his sense of 
humor, etc.).  On the Relationship theory we also have an account 
of why it would be reasonable for Anna to fall out of love with 
Harry:  there are certain relationship defining demands that Harry has 
failed to live up to.  One might argue that this is mistaken, though, 
since Harry’s killing is not something that figures into his 
relationship with Anna.  We can understand relation ship defining 
demands in at least two ways.  First, we could opt for a completely 
subjective account of such demands, holding that the content of 
such demands, which place constraints on acceptable behavior in a 
relationship, is something which is determined by Anna’s 
psychology – for example, what she expects, reasonably or not, 
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from Harry.  On this view of such demands, whether Harry has 
violated them depends on whether or not he has violated what 
Anna takes them to be.  She is the final arbiter.  Note, though, that 
Harry could then have his own set of independent relationship 
defining demands.  On the subjective view, of course, there may be 
no overlap at all. 
However, we could have amore objective view in which there 
are at least some relationship defining demands that obtain 
independently of what the person’s in those relationships believe, 
desire, etc.   This more objective approach conforms better to 
intuitions regarding Anna.  She may feel love for Lime, and in the 
short term this may not be controllable, but she can still engage in 
action that blocks or counteracts her emotions. 
One might not endorse one’s own desires at all, for example – 
and that is something we have control over.  Take a slightly 
different version of Anna, someone who finds herself still in the 
grip of her emotional attachment to Harry Lime and yet who 
realizes she should not love him, that he is the sort of person who 
deserves to not have her consideration.  On a sophisticated 
Bestowal View this might not count as ‘real’ love since she is not 
endorsing her emotional attachment to Lime.  However, the 
Bestowal View will have a problem with the idea that in the case of 
second Anna – the Anna who wishes she did not have the feelings 
she does for Harry Lime, that Anna is right, and the other Anna, 
who endorses those feelings, is wrong.  On the Bestowal View it is 
the attitudes independently of what they pick up on that matter in 
the bestowal of value.  And this does seem strongly 
counterintuitive – in the way that purely subjective accounts of 
reasons, in general, are. 
In the actual version of The Third Man, Anna’s love for Harry 
reveals that something in Velleman’s account should at least be 
qualified.  Velleman holds that love “…arrests our tendencies 
toward emotional self-protection from another person, tendencies 
to draw ourselves in and close ourselves off from being affected by 
him.  Love disarms our emotional defenses; it makes us vulnerable 
to the other.”12  However, love can also render us prone to a 
different sort of self-protection that leads to either self-deception 
12 David Velleman, “Love as a Moral Emotion,” Ethics, 109 
(January 1999), 361. 
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or a kind of emotional dogmatism that some view central to ‘true’ 
love.  This is the ‘love is blind’ trope. 
What can account for the asymmetry in these intuitions?  Why 
is there no duty to love out of a recognition of a person’s good 
qualities, but in some cases a duty to not love in recognition of their 
bad qualities? I think we can appeal to the Relationship View and 
subsume some of the intuitions that support the quality view into 
the Relationship View. On the Relationship View, reasons for love 
kick in once the relationship is established.  This is compatible with 
it being the case that there are no reasons to fall in love and establish 
the relationship in the first place.  What of relationships, like the 
parent/child relationship in which one might take the relationship 
itself as just a given, something that is established simply in virtue 
of the mere existence of a parent and child?  Even in these cases, 
there is no duty to love, though there very may well be a duty to 
act as though one loves.  This is because what goes into a 
relationship of the relevant sort is more than the bare biological 
relationship.   
However, though there is no duty to love in recognition of the 
good, a recognition of the bad features of a person ought in some 
cases to preclude entering into a relationship with that person, and, 
once in a relationship, to abandon it.  But then we have another 
oddity:  why to bad qualities preclude and yet good qualities fail to 
require?  Prior to entering into a relationship with another, the fact 
that someone has good qualities does nothing to distinguish that 
person from very many others.  The selectivity of love requires 
grounding in a relationship.  However, when a person has bad 
qualities, and if those bad qualities are such that they serve to 
violate relationship defining demands, there can be a duty to not 
love, depending on the severity of those violations.  Note that this 
is in addition to yet further claims one might make about what love 
or lack of love can reveal:  a child may have not duty to love a 
parent (as opposed to a duty to feel gratitude), but failure to love 
under some circumstances can reveal something very bad about a 
person’s character that may still warrant negative evaluation. 
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